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Lessons for Today by the Deregulation of 
Yesteryear: Analyzing Modern Capital 
Market Deregulation with Historical 
Examples 
Jordan J. Saddoris1 
Abstract 
Financial market regulators in the US have proposed cutting 
down their own rulebooks in recent years. However, when it 
comes to deregulating modern capital markets, the outcomes of 
historical alterations of similar natures should serve as lessons in 
modern-day proposals to deregulate US financial markets, using 
historical actions to argue for the likely efficacy of each. 
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Modern capital markets are one of the most sophisticated and rapidly 
evolving areas of American society; yet, the most valuable lessons on 
Since 2017 however, those lessons have gone largely unheeded and 
unmentioned as capital market regulators in the US have rushed to rewrite, 
and even erase, parts of the rulebook. Three deregulatory modifications, 
as proposed in 2020, have the potential to change the future landscape of 
markets for decades to come. Given the uncertain results of each, I argue 
that we should listen to what historical examples of deregulating markets 
really are. 
The objective of this comment is to discuss the likely efficacy of three 
modern-day proposals to deregulate certain aspects of capital markets in 
light of historical deregulation actions. It is important to note that the 
analysis herein aims not to prove that capital market deregulation is some 
sort of golden lever for financial growth and prosperity, nor that it is an 
evil method of loophole creation that will lead to our collective downfall. 
Rather, it aims to show the collective idiocy of such absolutism by 
bringing circumstances and catalysts together with both intended and 
unintended consequences to show that the devil truly is in the details when 
it comes to capital market deregulation. 
The comment is broken down into four parts. Part 1 provides 
background on capital markets and their regulators before explaining the 
 
2 WILLIAM BERNSTEIN, THE FOUR PILLARS OF INVESTING: LESSONS FOR BUILDING A 
WINNING PORTFOLIO (2002) (McGraw-Hill., 1st ed. 2002) (quoting Sir John Marks 
Templeton). 
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basic economic theories behind regulation and deregulation. Part 2 
introduces three deregulatory proposals and their respective objectives and 
rationales. Following that outlay, Part 3 digs into a handful of historical 
instances of financial market deregulation for what was changed, why it 
was done, and what it led to. Finally, utilizing those historical lessons, Part 
proposals. 
PART 1: FINANCIAL MARKETS & THE SCIENCE OF 
REGULATION 
 . . . by directing that industry in such a manner as its produce may 
be of the greatest value, he intends only his own gain, and he is in this, as 
in many other cases, led by an invisible hand to promote an end which was 
3 
The theoretical 
conceptually identical to the role of markets that Adam Smith wrote of 
nearly 250 years ago. The purpose of modern financial markets is to allow 
capital to be directed to its most productive use in an efficient manner.4 
Not to be oversimplified however, an endless number of not-so-invisible 
factors play into the operation of modern capital markets, often wielding 
nothing more than the overconfidence of an overpriced tucked-in shirt. 
And while modern capital markets create tremendous tangible benefits, 
such as information aggregation, price determination and risk 
diversification,5 they are not without the occasional harsh reality of those 
ends which were never intended. 
1.1  Markets & Their Keepers 
Public and private capital markets are essentially the same game being 
played in a different arena under different rules. They operate differently 
and offer respective advantages and disadvantages for issuers and 
investors. Public markets here in the US are found on exchanges such as 
NYSE
Mercantile Exchange that accept offers to buy and sell from the general 
public by way of brokers. Due to regulated disclosure requirements, public 
equity markets are arguably far more transparent and efficient, while 
 
3 ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF 
NATIONS, Volume 1, Book 4, Chapter 2 (Project Gutenberg, 2009) (1776) (ebook). 
4 See JUKKA GRONOW, DECIPHERING MARKETS AND MONEY 132-34 (Helsinki 
University Press, 2020). 
5 Leigh Tesfatsion, Introductory Notes on Financial Markets, (Mar. 5, 2012), 
http://www2.econ.iastate.edu/tesfatsi/finintro.htm. 
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typically carrying lower chances of undisclosed risk than their private 
counterparts.6 And with the help of ever-evolving technology, US public 
markets offer greater degrees of liquidity than private markets by 
providing a forum where securities can change hands in milliseconds 
during open trading, which is generally available at least 250 days a year. 
Private markets on the other hand are far more amorphous. The term 
-public exchange of rarely or 
never traded securities which stretches beyond mainstream stocks and 
bonds.7 However, in reality, private markets are the forum where stocks, 
bonds, and other investment vehicles are bought and sold between parties 
consenting to price discovery on a micro level rather than publicly traded. 
While the lack of liquidity is an obvious drawback on private market 
investment framework, the capability to produce returns far above and 
beyond those typically realized in public markets maintains a steady 
demand for private securities. In fact, since 2009 the amount of capital 
raised in private exempt offerings has exceeded the amount raised through 
registered offerings in every single year by at least $500 billion each 
year.8 
Federal law, however, generally limits access to these markets.9 
Elected federal officials and administrative agencies share responsibilities 
for regulating and overseeing public and private markets. While the United 
SEC  or 
Commission
both the legislative and executive branches also play significant roles in 
New Deal in the shadows of the Great Depression, the SEC has three main 
missions in its regulatory role today: (1) protect investors; (2) maintain 
fair, orderly, and efficient markets and (3) facilitate capital 
formation.10 To carry out its missions, the SEC regulates the key 
participants in securities markets to promote the disclosure of important 
market-related information in order to maintain fair dealing and protect 
against fraud amongst them.11 Additionally, the United States Treasury 
Department, the Board of Governors of the US Federal Reserve (the 
 
6 See Alex Browning, The Rewards of Private Equity s Unrewarded  Risks, CALLAN 
(July 12, 2017), https://www.callan.com/private-equity-risks/. 
7 Robin Wigglesworth, Private versus public markets is the battle to watch, FIN. TIMES 
(Feb. 8, 2019), https://www.ft.com/content/7ce1ee52-2b0e-11e9-88a4-c32129756dd8. 
8 Id. 
9 See id.; see also Private Equity Funds, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM N, 
https://www.investor.gov/introduction-investing/basics/investment-products/private-
equity-funds. 
10 What We Do, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM N, 
https://www.sec.gov/Article/whatwedo.html (last modified Dec. 18, 2020). 
11 See id. 
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Fed CFTC
serve ancillary, yet vital, regulator roles. 
1.2  Theory of Regulation & Deregulation 
Since federal supervision of financial markets began, observers have 
questioned whether regulatory actions actually benefit the market 
participants as anticipated or further the intended objectives.12 Those 
questions can be asked within the context of both the addition and removal 
of capital market restrictions. Regulation is often viewed as merely 
creating economic costs in order to maintain certain authoritative controls. 
However, such simple-minded analyses fail to see the whole picture. In 
reality, regulation typically provides certain qualitative benefits to capital 
markets as a whole, such as an informed investor base, improved liquidity, 
and decreased losses to fraud.13 Think of gasoline taxes for a useful 
analogy. While imposition of a tax on fuel obviously creates added 
economic costs, the cost-
benefits of having roads to drive on or bridges that are maintained provide 
the harder-to-quantify second half of that equation. Deregulation should 
be examined in a similar, but reverse fashion. 
which governments seek to control or mold social and individual 
cond 14 In connection to capital markets, two of the most common 
justifications for regulation are influencing resource allocation and 
maintaining economic stability.15 
Additionally, disclosure and due diligence are the foundational 
concepts of securities regulation.16 The function of due diligence is to 
provide the public with the relevant information that is then reflected in 
the market price of securities.17 
regulation works because it puts decision-making power in the hands of 
 
12 Marcia M. Cornett, Wallace N. Davidson & Nanda Rangan, Deregulation in 
investment banking: Industry concentration following Rule 415, 20 J. OF BANKING & FIN. 
85, 100 (1996). 
13 See generally Sam Peltzman, The Economic Theory of Regulation after a Decade of 
Deregulation, BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY (1989). 
14 Robert B. Horwitz, Understanding Deregulation, 15 THEORY & SOCIETY 139, 141 
(Jan. 1986). 
15 Henry C. Wallich, Member, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Rsrv. Sys., Financial 
Deregulation in the United States & in Developing Countries, Paper presented to Int l Conf. 
on Fin. Dev. of Latin America & Carribbean, Caracas, Venezuela (Feb. 29, 1985). 
16 See generally Cornett et al., supra note 12 at 91. 
17 See id. at fn.7. 
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18 When armed with the 
-positioned to 
evaluate their investment opportunities and to allocate their capital as they 
19 
While regulation has often been blamed for increased economic costs, 
enactment process for market regulations over the past decade.20 For 
example, the current offering exemption framework contains differing 
levels, designed to allow issuers the flexibility to choose their 
economically optimal balance of regulatory burden and available capital.21 
Alternatively, deregulation is a far less precise method of governing 
markets that is typically employed to combat market downturns. Often 
thought of as addition by subtraction, deregulation occurs when regulators 
take a laissez faire approach in order to allow market forces to further the 
22 
Allowing organic market forces to further objectives is a key point in 
discussing the theoretical economic concept of deregulation. It makes little 
sense to deregulate for nothing more than the sake of the political brownie 
points of deregulating, just as the case would be for imposing regulations. 
Whether it be simplifying the rulebook or adding to it, changes should be 
done for a strategic and logical purpose. When organic market forces could 
accomplish regulatory objectives more efficiently, or when the objectives 
themselves have changed, deregulation is a logical means to a rational end. 
There are two basic elements of effective financial deregulation: (1) a 
regulation that currently creates economic cost beyond its economic 
benefit (2) that, when relaxed, repealed, or amended, would lead market 
 
18 Letter from Stacey Cunningham, President, NYSE Group, to Vanessa Countryman 
commenting on SEC Release 34-84842, https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-26-18/s72618-
5165052-183443.pdf. 
19 Commissioner Troy A. Paredes, Remarks at the SEC Speaks in 2013 (Feb. 22, 2013) 
(transcript available at https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2013-spch022213taphtm); see 
also Chair Mary Jo White, The SEC after the Financial Crisis: Protecting Investors, 
Preserving Markets (Jan. 17, 2017) (transcript available at 
https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/the-sec-after-the-financial-crisis.html) ( Investors 
expect, and rely on, full and accurate disclosure to make investment decisions and take 
risks; the Commission, in turn, is charged to act sharply to stop fraud and prevent unfair 
and dishonest practices, including misleading disclosures ). 
20 See Implementation of the Current Guidance on Economic Analysis in SEC 
Rulemakings, Rep. 516, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM N (June 6, 2013), 
https://www.sec.gov/files/516.pdf. 
21 See Alan R. Palmiter, Toward Disclosure Choice in Securities Offerings, 1999 
COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1, 5 (1999). 
22 See id.; see also Elias Semaan & Pamela P. Drake, Deregulation & Risk, 40 FIN. 
MGMT. 295, 295 (Summer 2011). 
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participants to make more economically efficient decisions.23 As applied, 
removing or amending rules and regulations that affect economic 
decisions made by firms24 
deregulation can produce positive economic results.25 Typically, market 
deregulation is designed to open an industry to competition, which should 
stimulate innovation and the development of products that benefit 
consumers.26 However, deregulated competition can also affect 
profitability, as deregulation decreases compliance costs but also lowers 
barriers to entry.27 Deregulation also risks losing the qualitative benefits 
of the original regulation. All things included, one must remember that 
d varied effects have shown only that it 
is an inexact science positive outcomes are not guaranteed.28 
 
PART 2:  TRIO OF DEREGULATORY PROPOSALS29 
Technology and innovation are constantly disrupting in mostly 
positive ways the manner in which markets work and investors transact.  
The SEC must recognize this and strive to ensure that our rules and 
30 
While regulators have implemented deregulatory changes in the past, 
the regulatory renovation efforts in capital markets in recent years have 
inauguration, market regulators have embarked on a widespread 
regulatory reformation focused on thinning the rulebook.31 Over the final 
two years of the Trump administration, market regulators proposed three 
particularly significant deregulatory efforts to: (1) scale down the quarterly 
reporting requirements for public companies; (2) simplify the exemption 
 
23 See Wallich, supra note 15, at 115. 
24 Id. 
25 See Horwitz, supra note 14. 
26 Elias Semaan & Pamela P. Drake, Deregulation & Risk, 40 FIN. MGMT. 295, 295 
(2011). 
27 See id. 
28 See Lawrence G. Goldberg & Lawrence J. White, THE DEREGULATION OF THE 
BANKING & SECURITIES INDUSTRIES 115 (Lexington Books 1979). 
29 Author s Note: This comment was originally submitted for publication in February 
2020 and as such does not contain a full discussion of the various SEC proposing and 
adopting releases; however, citations to such releases are provided for reference where 
applicable. 
30 Jay Clayton, Chairman, Sec. & Exch. Comm n, Remarks on the Economic Club of 
New York (July 12, 2017), https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/remarks-economic-club-
new-york. 
31 See Exec. Order No. 13771, 82 Fed. Reg. 22 (Feb. 3, 2017). 
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framework for securities offerings; and (3) slash the traditional 
prerequisites for investing in private markets. 
Contextually, the prosperity of US capital markets, from 2018 until 
the onslaught of the COVID-19 pandemic in March 2020, provides a 
highly relevant backdrop to consider when analyzing these proposals. 
Affluence in public markets during this period is evidenced by the S&P 
-largest yearly gain in two decades in 
2019.32 Meanwhile, private hedge fund managers came into 2018 with 
more money than ever before: an estimated $3.2 trillion in assets under 
management an increase of approximately 128% since 2009.33 This 
departure from the traditional rationale of utilizing deregulatory measures 
makes the fact that these 
proposals were made within a time period of market affluence very 
significant. 
2.1  Relaxation of Quarterly Reporting 
Copious factors in recent years have contributed to a market 
ecosystem that values a short-term alignment at the expense of long-term 
growth focus. As then-
short-term results among companies may lead to inefficient allocation of 
capital, reduce long-term returns for Main Street investors, and encumber 
 The Nasdaq staff similarly expressed in their comment 
-termism not only impacts companies but 
34 According to the results of 
one Nasdaq survey, 74% of listed company respondents believed that over 
40% of their influential investors value short-term returns over long-term 
returns a chilling trend.35 Furthermore, nearly half of all reporting 
company respondents reported feeling business constraints about 
engaging in long-term investments.36 
Starting in 2017, regulators and politicians began to murmur about 
reductions to the reporting frequency and content requirements of public 
company filings. In August 2018, then-President Trump formally directed 
the SEC to begin exploring the possibility of eliminating the quarterly 
 
32 See S&P 500 Index - 90 Year Historical Chart, MACROTRENDS, 
https://www.macrotrends.net/2324/sp-500-historical-chart-data. 
33 HFR Global Hedge Fund Industry Report- Year End 2017 published, HEDGE FUND 
RESEARCH 1, 1 (Jan 19, 2018). 
34 Sec y of Sec. and Exch. Comm n of the U.S., Comment Letter on the Short-
Term/Long-Term Management of Public Companies, Our Periodic System and Regulatory 
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reporting requirements for public companies all together,37 later claiming 
via Twitter that the idea had been posed to him by an unnamed business 
a 38 
The Executive Branch was not alone though, as both chambers of 
39 -
thought out than the 140 characters emanating from the White House. In 
particular, Congress only requested that the SEC provide a cost-benefit 
analysis on scaled disclosure and the use of Form 10-Q40 for quarterly 
reporting with a focus towards smaller, emerging growth companies.41 
Decreasing the quarterly disclosure burden had also been on the mind 
of Jay Clayton ever since his first public comments as SEC Chairman. In 
that 2017 speech, Chairman Clayton expressed that the results of increased 
disclosure requirements and other reporting burdens on public companies 
42 Eventually, the Commission 
followed suit and issued a formal release requesting public comments on 
the potential implications of a reduction to quarterly reporting.43 Through 
a rather broad prompt, the SEC sought industry input on cutdowns to 
quarterly disclosure obligations as well as the growing trend toward short-
term outlooks by both investors and management teams. Amongst the 
 
37 Michael Posner, Why Quarterly Reporting From Business Makes Sense, FORBES 
(Aug. 17, 2018, 1:46 PM), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/michaelposner/2018/08/17/why-quarterly-reporting-from-
business-makes-sense/?sh=4a9630627ed8. 
38 See Should Companies Abandon Quarterly Earnings Reports?, WHARTON SCH. OF 
THE UNIV. OF PA. (Aug. 27, 2018), https://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article/ending-
quarterly-reporting/ (identifying the commenter as former Pepsi CEO Indra Nooyi who 
later explained that her comment was taken out of context by Trump). 
39 S. 488, 115th Cong. § 2201 (2018). Note: provision contained within the JOBS & 
Investor Confidence Act of 2018 bill that passed in both houses but died at the end of the 
115th Congress due to different versions of other, unrelated provisions. 
40 See SEC, Form 10-Q General Instructions, https://www.sec.gov/about/forms/form10-
q.pdf (10-Q filings are the quarterly reports that public companies file with the SEC to 
provide regulators and investors alike with financial statements, general risk information 
pertinent to the business, and other miscellaneous disclosures). 
41 See EVA SU & GARY SHORTER, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R45308, JOBS AND INVESTOR 
CONFIDENCE ACT: CAPITAL MARKETS PROVISIONS 7 (2018). 
42 See Clayton, supra note 30; see also Mark Lebovitch & Jacob Spaid, In Corporations 
We Trust: Ongoing Deregulation & Government Protections, HARVARD LAW SCH. F. ON 
CORP. GOVERNANCE (Feb. 6, 2019), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2019/02/06/in-
corporations-we-trust-ongoing-deregulation-and-government-protections/. 
43 See Request for Comment on Earnings Releases and Quarterly Reports, U.S. SEC. & 
EXCH. COMM N, Rel. Nos. 33-10588, 34-84842 (Dec. 18, 2018). 
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nearly 100 responses were comment letters from the NYSE, Nasdaq, and 
each of the four major accounting firms.44 
There is a multitude of options when it comes to regulating the flow 
of public company information; however, an approach based upon 
mandatory disclosure has been overwhelmingly favored since the initial 
federal securities laws from the New Deal era.45 It is no secret that 
companies spend into the millions on reporting costs and are not always 
eager to expound on poor short-term results or reveal new material risks 
facing the business; yet, pursuant to federal securities regulations such 
revelations must be publicly made every three months.46 Thus, the 
proposal to reduce a major aspect of the reporting regime was a 
noteworthy topic for issuers and investors. 
Separately, Chairman Clayton set out to cut back on the plethora of 
legalese that he claimed hinders Main Street investors understanding of 
-
count for SEC filings has more than doubled, yet readability of those 
documents is at an all-  his desire to buck the trend 
by providing more basic press-release styled information.47 The 
then-Chairman conveniently failed to mention that it was already 
commonplace on the market for registrants to report quarterly earnings 
results in a press release furnished in a current report on Form 8-K. 
Improving the readability of public disclosures and counteracting the 
short-term mentality of both Wall Street and reporting companies 
themselves were also regularly cited as justifications.48 And by proposing 
an end to certain quarterly reporting requirements, regulators strove to 
-term 
 
44 Stacey Cunningham, Comment Letter on Earnings Releases and Quarterly Reports 
(March 21, 2019), https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-26-18/s72618-5165052-183443.pdf; 
John A. Zecca, Comment Letter on Earnings Releases and Quarterly Reports (March 21, 
2019), https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-26-18/s72618-5165052-183443.pdf; KPMG 
LLP, Comment Letter on Earnings Releases and Quarterly Reports (March 21, 2019), 
https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-26-18/s72618-5165052-183443.pdf; Deloitte & 
Touche LLP, Comment Letter on Earnings Releases and Quarterly Reports (March 21, 
2019), https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-26-18/s72618-5165052-183443.pdf; Ernest & 
Young LLP, Comment Letter on Earnings Releases and Quarterly Reports (March 21, 
2019), https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-26-18/s72618-5165052-183443.pdf; PWC LLP, 
Comment Letter on Earnings Releases and Quarterly Reports (March 21, 2019), 
https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-26-18/s72618-5165052-183443.pdf. 
45 Elisabeth de Fontenay, The Deregulation of Private Capital & the Decline of the 
Public Company, 68 HASTINGS L. J. 445, 474 (2017). 
46 See generally Posner, supra note 37. 
47 Clayton, supra note 30. 
48 See Posner, supra note 37. 
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profits at the expense of long- 49 
Combating the apparent short-term mentality on Wall Street is one 
objective also supported by several prominent investors. In fact, certain 
both national policy and business, effective long-term strategy drives 
50 
2.2  Harmonization of Offering Exemptions 
For private market issuers, the most significant deregulatory move 
proposed in a 2019 SEC concept release was the simplification of the 
framework for private securities offering exemptions.51 The Concept 
Release on Harmonization of Securities Offering Exemptions52 
Harmonization Initiative Harmonization
tremendous breadth of the deregulatory changes being considered by the 
Commission during that time.53 
In the bigger picture though, the reformation is to restructure the 
exempt offering framework to ensure that the system as a whole is 
rational, accessible, and effective.54 The release suggests that the current 
regulatory framework governing offerings exempt from registration may 
be overly complex, duplicative, and inefficient.55 The Commission also 
56 however, several of the 
exemption requirements that would be relaxed would affect larger issuers 
as well. Although the SEC addresses the issue of complexity throughout 
the entire exemption framework, a major focus is the simplification of the 
regulatory exemption under Rule 506(b) of Regulation D. This is 
noteworthy for the fact that the Rule 506(b) exemption has accounted for 
 
49 Jamie Dimon & Warren E. Buffet, Short-Termism Is Harming the Economy, WALL 
STREET JOURNAL (June 6, 2018, 10:00 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/short-termism-
is-harming-the-economy-1528336801. 
50 Id. 
51 A concept release is to solicit the public s views on securities issues in order to 
evaluate the need for future rulemaking. 
52 See Concept Release on Harmonization of Securities Offering Exemptions, U.S. SEC. 
& EXCH. COMM N, Rel. Nos. 33-10649; 34-86129; IA-5256 (June 18, 2019). 
53 See Era Anagnosti & Colin J. Diamond & David Johansen & John Vetterli, SEC: Time 
to revamp securities offering exemptions, WHITE & CASE LLP (July 23, 2019), 
https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=5945214c-f980-4f26-a3ba-
fdce62e42ae0. 
54 Jay Clayton, Chairman, Sec. & Exch. Comm n, Remarks on Capital Formation at the 
Nashville (August 29, 2018). 
55 See id. 
56 Concept Release on Harmonization of Securities Offering Exemptions, supra note 52, 
at 6. 
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more than half of all private capital raised in recent years.57 The proposed 
changes to the 506(b) exemption alone would make the Harmonization a 
mammoth of a deregulatory move. 
Furthermore, the Harmonization Initiative was designed to improve 
the liquidity of securities issued pursuant to an exemption to the 
registration requirements by reducing holding periods and resale 
restrictions.58 The proposal acknowledges how limited secondary market 
59 However, any 
drastic change would have potentially wide-ranging impacts on public 
market volatility. In response, the Harmonization Initiative strives to 
alleviate that problem through the seeming compromise of additional 
resale transaction exemptions. 
2.3   
Tucked in the back half of the same June 2019 concept release was an 
independently significant proposal to reduce the restrictions on who can 
invest in non-public offerings. Specifically, it proposed expansion of the 
s by 
way of new sophistication criteria to meet such revised accreditation 
threshold. This widening of qualifications was noteworthy because the 
60 
a person who met any of the eight monetary-based standards enumerated 
in Rule 501(a) of Regulation D.61 Those wealth and income standards 
investors best able to protect themselves from securities fraud were those 
62 
 
57 Id. at 19 (table 2). 
58 See Anagnosti et al., supra note 53; see generally Concept Release on Harmonization 
of Securities Offering Exemptions, supra note 52, at 193-210. 
59 Concept Release on Harmonization of Securities Offering Exemptions, supra note 52, 
at 193-94. 
60 Id. at 32. 
61 See 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a) (specifically, the individual investors must have either an 
annual income of $200,000 individually (or $300,000 with spouse)), or a $1 million net 
worth (excluding the value of personal residence) in order to currently qualify as an 
accredited investor). 
62 David Stockton, How The SEC Could Expand Access To Private Offerings, 
KILPATRICK TOWNSEND (July 16, 2019), 
https://www.kilpatricktownsend.com/en/Blog/securities/2019/7/How-The-SEC-Could-
Expand-Access-To-Private-Offerings (mentioning also that the definition enacted in 1982 
has only been significantly amended once in 2010 to remove the value of an investor s 
personal residence from the individual wealth calculation). 
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Specifically, the SEC proposed two categories of changes to the 
accreditation definition: (1) amending the current monetary standards, and 
(2) adding new sophistication criteria.63 
(based largely on SEC staff recommendations) suggested that the 
longstanding income and net worth requirements remain as is, but be 
adjusted for inflation going forward.64 The recommended alternative to 
that approach would be to limit a single investment at 10% of the investors 
annual income.65 Second, the proposed addition of sophistication 
thresholds involved a bevy of potential criteria for becoming an accredited 
investor.66 Such suggested criteria included items such as level of 
investment experience, industry-based examinations, or even simple opt-
in clauses after risk disclosures.67 
The two primary reasons behind the proposed changes to the 
accredited investor definition were: (1) public vs. private market 
opportunity imbalances, and (2) several years of unheeded staff 
recommendations that had been supported by the industry. The imbalance 
of public versus private market opportunities stems from the declining 
growth of public market investment opportunities in contrast with booms 
in private market investment offerings.68 The intent to expand investor 
access stems from the astronomical returns to private equity and venture 
capital investors from several now-public tech unicorns69 that were 
criticized as overvalued when sold to the public.70 
become louder and more frequent that the middle-class investor is being 
unfairly discriminated against by being shut out from participating in these 
71 Essentially, it became clear that those allowed 
in as early-stage private investors made off with exorbitant returns as 
public investors were left holding the bag when large valuations fell apart 
 
63 See Concept Release on Harmonization of Securities Offering Exemptions, supra note 
52, at 54-60. 
64 Id. 
65 See id. at 39, 52-55. 
66 See id. 
67 See id. at 50-56. 
68 See Michael Ewens and Joan Farre-Mensa, The Deregulation of the Private Equity 
Markets & the Decline in IPOs, 33 REV. OF FINANCIAL STUDIES 5463 (2020). 
69 The term unicorn  is used to refer to startup companies reached $1+ billion 
valuations with only private investment. See Aileen Lee, Welcome to the Unicorn Club: 
Learning from Billion-Dollar Startups, TECHCRUNCH (Nov. 2, 2013), 
http://techcrunch.com/2013/11/02/welcome-to-the- unicorn-club. 
70 See generally David Trainer, The Unicorn Bubble is Bursting, FORBES (Oct. 7, 2019), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/greatspeculations/2019/10/07/the-unicorn-bubble-is-
bursting/#1da928a88198 
71 Stockton, supra note 62, at 2. 
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over time through more disclosure and greater price discovery in the public 
markets. 
The proposed expansion of accreditation restrictions had two 
conceptually ambitious goals in addressing those imbalances. First, to 
expand access by increasing the number of investors eligible to participate 
in private markets. Second, to increase the amount of capital that is 
available to businesses through exempt private offerings. In simple terms, 
the proposed alterations to the accredited investor qualifications were 
designed to increase both supply and demand of private capital without 
72 
In addition to the influence of unbalanced market opportunities, calls 
for revisions to the accredited investor definition had been coming from 
within the regulatory agencies since as early as 2015, when the 
Commission released a staff report which recommended alternative 
approaches to the definition.73 However, no changes were made to the 
applicable regulation. In every year since then, internal departments of 
both the SEC and Treasury have formally recommended cutting the 
requirements for accreditation.74 
2019 concept release factors in the overwhelming amount of industry 
changes to the accredited investor definition.75 In fact, one of the most 
additional methods of 
this proposal.76 
PART 3: HISTORICAL LESSONS IN DEREGULATION 
There are answers worth billio 77 
History is meant to be learned from, so as to prevent the repetition of 
failures must first be understood themselves. This ideal is as true for 
 
72 See Comment from Advisory Committee on Small & Emerging Companies, 
Recommendations Regarding the Accredited Investor Definition (July 20, 2016). 
73 See generally Concept Release on Harmonization of Securities Offering Exemptions, 
supra note 52, at 41-44. 
74 See id. at 44-45. 
75 Id. 
76 Id. 
77 Charlie Munger, Poor Charlie s Almanack: The Wit and Wisdom of Charles T. 
Munger (2005) (Mr. Munger is widely regarded as one of the most successful investment 
minds of the 21st century, Munger has been the Vice Chairman of Berkshire Hathaway 
since 1978). 
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market regulation as it is in all aspects of human society. This portion of 
the comment lays out deregulatory changes of past eras in detail to provide 
 
For context, the change in theoretical economic understanding of 
regulation in the 1960s and 1970s provided a catalyst for a new era of 
deregulating financial markets.78 
theory, where regulations raise prices and reduce competition, can be seen 
differently in the deregulatory changes of that era. One example shows 
how reduced regulation can stimulate market competition and innovation. 
While the other demonstrates how deregulation can achieve its desired 
direct results but indirectly reduce competition. In more recent history, the 
late 1990s to early 2000s was arguably the most pronounced deregulatory 
era in US capital markets that the nation has ever seen. Four different 
deregulatory moves that occurred in that time period, and their eventual 
effects, are explained and anal
market conditions in mind. 
3.1   
At the time, May 1, 1975 was considered by some to be the most 
momentous day on Wall Street since the forming of the original stock 
exchange in 1792.79 On what is 
regulators abolished the fixed-rate commissions floor for securities 
brokers.80 For 183 years, the cost per share for investors to make a trade 
had remained nearly the exact same. Whether it was 100 shares of Proctor 
& Gamble in 1891 or 100,000 shares of Coca-Cola in 1974, the broker 
charged the investor at least 2% for the trade.81 
Amid mounting political and judicial anti-trust concerns, SEC Rule 
19b-3 deregulated commission rates with the goal of inducing a level of 
free-market pricing competition that the financial services industry had 
never seen before.82 Initially, well-established brokerage houses 
vehemently opposed the deregulation due to the profit losses that 
competition would cause. However, those Wall Street bankers eventually 
 
78 But see Edward J. Balleisen, Fraud: An American History from Barnum to Madoff, 
368, PRINCETON U. PRESS (2017) (discussing the intermittent spots of regulatory action that 
occurred during the mid-1970 s when deregulatory freedom offered to businesses and 
market actors was occasionally interrupted by stricter enforcement stances, the majority of 
which were in response to widely-reported fraud scandals that caught the eyes of firms and 
investors alike). 




82 See id. 
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basked in the newfound industry prosperity that Mayday had ignited. In 
fact, Mayday sparked a whole new era of innovation for the financial 
services industry and provided quantitative benefits to markets in general. 
n created a necessity to innovate and evolve.83 
Although Mayday did temporarily damage bottom lines in 1975, it also 
produced a need to create new revenue streams at brokerage houses. That 
need led to the creation of new investment products, many of which are 
still widely used today.84 In addition, equity markets also reaped indirect 
benefits of greater liquidity that resulted from the rise in trading volumes 
on the NYSE,85 where trading in 1976 had increased 52.36% from just two 
years prior.86 
Similarly, M
investors.87 Deregulation had led to a decline in average trading 
commissions through competition for the biggest clients; however, retail 
investors actually faced an increase in average rates from the pre-Mayday 
average of $0.30/share to around $0.41/share afterwards.88 Though, a few 
years later, growth in competition for business and entry of new discount 
brokerages eventually resulted in lower prices for retail investors.89 
new financial products and services offered to retail clients meant more 
options and opportunities for those main street investors who had limited 
choices on where to put their money pre-Mayday.90 
3.2  Shelf Registration & Rule 415 (1982) 
Adopted in 1982, Rule 415 of the Securities Act91 deregulated offering 
issuer corporations to file a registration statement and subsequently issue 
securities anytime during a period of up to two years.92 The basic premise 
behind the adoption of Rule 415 was the ability to streamline the process 
 
83 See id. 
84 See Zweig, supra note 79 (explaining the invention of zero coupon bonds and money-
market accounts, among others). 
85 See id. 
86 New York Stock Exchange, Inc., New York, N.Y., Facts & Figures , available at 
http://www2.census.gov/library/publications/2011/compendia/statab/131ed/tables/12s121
0.xls. 
87 Zweig, supra note 79. 
88 See id. 
89 See id. 
90 See id. 
91 17 C.F.R. § 230.415 (2020). 
92 Cornett et al., supra note 12, at 86. 
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of certain issuers bringing their securities into public markets by reducing 
complex red tape and the costs associated with it.93 
The desire to alter what was an inflexible system of offering securities, 
in terms of timing and offering design, was a central goal for Rule 415.94 
The intention was to eliminate obvious redundancies through an integrated 
system of securities registration that would streamline the disclosure 
system.95 e new system was designed to reduce compliance costs by 
eliminating duplicative disclosure, while providing investors with all 
96 A key component was 
duce the 
costs associated with repetitive disclosure.97 That revision essentially 
permitted issuers and underwriters to make the necessary disclosures once, 
at the beginning of the shelf period, and then conduct offerings 
continuously over the next two years. 
The root causes that led to Rule 415 came from a mixed bag of market 
trends toward such behaviors and regulator fear of losing out to 
international competition. The trend toward Rule 415 stemmed from the 
need created by Mayday for additional revenue streams at financial 
underwriters would purchase the majority of an issue of registered 
securities and then eventually distribute them publicly.98 In addition, 
regulators were motivated to loosen up the offering restrictions due to the 
pressure of keeping US issuers from migrating to other international 
markets.99 
The results of Rule 415 were both positive and negative. On the 
positive side, compliance and disclosure costs incurred by issuers 
declined.100 Over the handful of years leading up to, and following the 
investment banking industry.101 That trend intensified as both shelf and 
non-shelf issuers turned to a smaller circle of the most prominent 
 
93 See id. 
94 See David S. Allen, Robert E. Lamy, & G. Rodney Thompson, The Shelf Registration 
of Debt & Self Selection Bias, 45 J. OF FINANCE 275, 277 (1990). 
95 Id. at 276. 
96 Id. 
97 Id. 
98 See Arthur E. Wilmarth Jr., The Transformation of the U.S. Financial Services 
Industry, 1975-2000: Competition, Consolidation, & Increased Risks, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 
215, 327 (2002). 
99 Palmiter, supra note 21, at 40-41. 
100 See Mary C. Neary, SEC Rule 415: Resolving the Dilemma, 3 PACE L. R. 275, 282 
(Jan. 1983). 
101 Cornett et al., supra note 12, at 87. 
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underwriters in the business102 suggesting that other factors contributed to 
can be attributed to the fact that the most well-funded investment banks 
period, unlike less well-capitalized firms.103 
While the shelf-registration trend certainly allowed greater freedom to 
issuers, it also created risk of isolated incidents of large-scale losses at 
cost four US securities firms more than $300 million in just a few days 
when the stock market crash dropped share prices and the lack of liquidity 
left the banks holding the bag.104 During that same crash, securities firm 
decline in Blue Arrow share price.105 
3.3  National Securities Market Improvement Act (1996) 
NSMIA
overhauled the way securities markets were overseen by removing state 
regulators from the picture while also flooding private markets with a 
wave of new capital. In particular, NSMIA allowed federal securities law 
106 While covered securities included those that were publicly 
listed and sold to large institutional investors, they also included securities 
that were offered in private markets under certain federal exemptions to 
the Securities Act.107 Prior to the NSMIA, more than 75% of states 
required some form of merit-based review of securities before they could 
be approved for an offering.108 Both the issuing company and the 




103 See id. 
104 Wilmarth, supra note 98, at 411. 
105 Id. 
106 Justin Blount & Drew Thornley, Federal Preemption in Securities Laws, the 
Investment Contract, and Macroprudential Financial Regulation, 14 DEPAUL BUS. & 
COMM. L.J. 273, 281 (2016). 
107 Id. 
108 Id. 
109 Robert B. Robbins and Ella M. Lvov, The Rise of Unicorns and the Decline of Public 
Markets, 33 INSIGHTS 1, 7 (Apr. 2019), 
https://www.pillsburylaw.com/images/content/1/2/v2/124396/INSIGHTS-2019-04-
30.pdf. 
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Separately, § 209 of NSMIA lifted the cap on the number of clients 
that hedge funds could bring in so long as they met certain sophistication 
and asset requirements.110 Capital rushed into funds so fast that by 2003 
hedge fund assets had grown to ten times their pre-NSMIA value. The 
legislative rationale for NSMIA was based around the idea that less 
burdensome regulation would promote efficiency and capital formation 
without giving up investor protections.111 In the marketplace however, 
large institutional investors and hedge funds supported NSMIA as a way 
to get into private market opportunities offering alpha earning capabilities. 
The longer-term effect of NSMIA was the drastic decline in public 
offerings after 1996. NSMIA did in fact increase the supply of capital to 
private companies. But it was almost entirely to late-stage, larger 
companies;112 it changed next to nothing for smaller issuers.113 
3.4  Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (1999) 
One of the most well-known deregulatory actions in financial markets 
over the past century was the gradual repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act that 
was capped off in 1999 with the Gramm-Leach- GLB 114 
Also known as the Financial Modernization Act,115 GLB was the 
legislative capstone to over a decade of deregulating investment 
banking.116 The act itself formally repealed all restrictions against financial 
institutions combining banking, securities, and insurance businesses.117 
Enacted in the same year of twenty-four record-setting closes for the 
Nasdaq,118 GLB was spurred on by the technological advances around the 
turn of the millennium. At the time, rapid innovation in the financial 
services industry led to new products, new services, and new providers 
available to investors.119 With newer, more lucrative options available for 
 
110 See David Dayen, What Good Are Hedge Funds?, THE AMERICAN PROSPECT (Spring 
2016), https://prospect.org/power/good-hedge-funds/. 
111 See Rutheford B. Campbell Jr., The Impact of NSMIA on Small Issuers, 53 BUS. 
LAWYER 2, 575, 579-80 (1998). 
112 See Ewens, supra note 68, at 5487-88. 
113 Campbell, supra note 111, at 583. 
114 See Matthew Sherman, A SHORT HISTORY OF FINANCIAL DEREGULATION IN THE 
UNITED STATES 2 (2009), https://www.cepr.net/documents/publications/dereg-timeline-
2009-07.pdf. 
115 12 U.S.C. § 1843 (2018). 
116 Sherman, supra note 114, at 10. 
117 Id. 
118 See Nasdaq Official Closing Price Historical Data, Nasdaq.com, 
https://old.nasdaq.com/aspx/historical_nocp.aspx?symbol=NASDAQ&selected=NASDA
Q (last visited Apr. 11, 2021) (referencing the Nasdaq Composite Index, known as a 
benchmark index for tech investments). 
119 Wilmarth, supra note 98, at 435. 
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savings, investor demand shifted from old-school bank deposits to new-
age products such as mutual funds and variable annuities.120 As 
competition increased, banks needed to expand into these new markets for 
survival but were barred from doing so by Glass-Steagall.121 
In 1986 the Federal Reserve began to carve away at Glass-Steagall by 
up to five percent of their gross revenue via investment banking.122 
th
regulation is effective, then government regulation is at best unnecessary. 
At worst, the introduction of government regulations unavoidably 
123 Still prior to the passage of 
rendered . . 
124 The merger 
created the largest financial institution in the world at the time.125 
In November 1999, the enactment of the GLB Act provided the final 
nail in Glass-
reality that it was becoming increasingly difficult to maintain traditional 
distinctions between many of the activities of commercial banks, 
126 The primary goal of GLB 
can be thought of simply as codified acquiescence toward the 
administrative decisions already handed down by the Fed. Nonetheless, 
Congress did have its own stated goals for the repeal. Primarily, listed atop 
in the financial services industry by providing a prudential framework for 
the affiliation of banks, securities firms, insurance companies, and other 
financial service providers . . . 127 
 
120 See id. 
121 See Balleisen, supra note 78, at 358 (explaining that the Glass-Steagall Act was the 
partition which kept the largest banks from entering into the securities or insurance 
territories of financial markets). 
122 Sherman, supra note 114. 
123 Alan Greenspan, Chairman, The Fed. Reserve Board, Government regulation and 
derivative contracts , Remarks before the Financial markets Conference of the Federal 
Reserve Bank of Atlanta, Coral Gables, Florida (Feb. 21, 1997). 
124 Wilmarth, supra note 98, at 220 (quoting Michael K. O Neal, Summary and Analysis 
of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, 28 SEC. REG. L.J. 95, 96 (2000)). 
125 Id. 
126 Roger W. Ferguson, Jr., Vice Chairman, The Fed. Reserve Board, Remarks at the 
Future of Financial Services Conference, U. of Mass, Boston (Oct. 8, 2003). 
127 Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.A. (West 1999)). 
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Both the positive and negative effects of the GLB Act (and the actions 
which preceded it) on the financial industry cannot be overstated. On the 
positive side, allowing combined financial companies sparked a 
movement in the industry to become what become what is now the modern 
financial sector.128 
to the creation of financial services conglomerates, which made up a third 
of all financial holding companies.129 
In a mix of good and bad, the immediate effects of the Financial 
Modernization Act allowed for increased investment and innovation by 
the financial industry; however, those same positive results created an 
evolving system filled with misunderstood risk.130 As for the negative 
effects, look no further than the widespread nature of the Great Recession, 
-off approach became one of the most 
commonly cited culprits for the 2008 financial crisis.131 
of many Wall Street firms changed from relatively staid private 
partnerships to publicly traded corporations taking greater and more 
132 
financial institutions to use their own commercial banking operations to 
self-fund investment activities.133 Further, because historically separate 
institutions were able to legally operate under the same roof, obtaining 
arm had become as simple as walking across the hall. 
With more capital being more easily accessible, financial institutions 
began to expand their capacity to create securities themselves most 
commonly asset- ABS
mostly mortgage- MBS
mortgages bought from non-bank lenders, who utilized bank financing to 
issue m
 
128 Arthur E. Wilmarth Jr., How Should We Respond to the Growing Risks of Financial 
Conglomerates, in Financial Modernization After Gramm-Leach-Bliley (Patricia C. 
McCoy ed., 2002) ( Although the Citigroup merger and the GLB Act were landmark 
events, in a broader sense they are by products of the fundamental restructuring . . . , the 
dividing lines between banks, securities, firms and insurance companies began to disappear 
long before Congress passed the GLB Act. ). 
129 See Ferguson, supra note 126. 
130 See generally Fin. Crisis Inquiry Comm n, FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL 
COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES OF THE FINANCIAL & ECONOMIC CRISIS IN THE UNITED STATES, 
xvii (Jan. 2011), https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/GPO-FCIC/pdf/GPO-FCIC.pdf. 
131 See id. 
132 Id. 
133 See generally Balleisen, supra note 78. 
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134 
3.5  Commodity Futures Modernization Act (2000) 
Just a year after the passage of GLB, Congress continued on its 
deregulatory path with the Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 
2000135 CFMA 136 which exempted over-the- OTC
derivative securities transactions between sophisticated parties from both 
CFTC and SEC regulation.137 Basically, CFMA excluded certain 
derivatives traded in the OTC market from oversight so long as smaller 
retail investors were not allowed to trade.138 
was to allow for derivative financial contracts139 to be legally traded in the 
OTC market, and therefore off the CFTC-regulated exchanges.140 
141 
After Mayday banks and securities firms began to create financial 
derivative instruments which could be traded in two ways: (1) on 
organized public exchanges, or (2) in OTC markets. Dominated by the 
142 By the 
end of the year, the seven most active bank dealers in the United States 
held derivatives with total notional values of more than $38 trillion
seven times the value held just ten years earlier.143 
-off approach was to make sure that 
y of the dominance of US investment 
markets. Along with the growth and innovation came the threat of 
international competition in derivative markets. Both legislative and 
regulatory leaders began to believe that imposing regulations on the 
growing OTC deri
and growth of these important markets and damage U.S. leadership in 
these arenas by driving transactions off- 144 However, not every 
 
134 Id. 
135 See generally 12 U.S.C. § 1843. 
136 See generally Sherman, supra note 114. 
137 Balleisen, supra note 78, at 358. 
138 MARK JICKLING, CONG. RSCH. SERV., RS22912, THE ENRON LOOPHOLE 1 (2008). 
139 Id. (including instruments like futures, options, or swaps, whose value is linked to the 
price of some underlying commodity). 
140 Id. 
141 Id. 
142 See Wilmarth Jr., supra note 98, at 333. 
143 See COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, OCC BANK DERIVATIVES REPORT, FOURTH 
QUARTER tbl.5 2000. 
144 THE PRESIDENT S WORKING GRP. ON FIN. MKTS, OVER-THE-COUNTER DERIVATIVES 
MARKETS AND THE COMMODITY EXCHANGE ACT (2008). 
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regulator saw it that way. Chairwoman of the Commodity Futures Trading 
CFTC
lurking in unregulated derivatives and spearheaded an effort to regulate 
them in 2000, only to be shot down by politicians.145 
ulation of the 
146 In fact, the majority 
of Wall Street opposed the regulation of derivatives, not because of some 
sort of nefarious intent, but due to a sense that derivatives market was 
helping financial institutions manage risk better through unregulated 
hedging with derivatives.147 
In the short-run, the deregulatory approach to OTC derivatives 
actually achieved its stated goal. US derivatives markets boomed in the 
increasing the notional value of 
derivatives held by US commercial banks to $182.1 trillion by the second 
quarter of 2008.148 
exemption of only OTC derivatives trading is exemplified by the fact that 
95.5% of that value was attributable to the OTC markets.149 With that, the 
ed all 
conceivable corners of the financial system to the underlying 
150After the financial crisis hit in 2008, even Greenspan himself 
came to admit that a hands-off approach was flawed when it came to 
financial markets. During a congressional hearing in late 2008, he testified, 
151 
As time passed, the dangerous effects of CFMA began to show 
through the 2001 collapse of Enron and the lack of transparency that 
allowed the fraud to go on as long as it did. Before the CFMA, the majority 
 
145 Balleisen, supra note 78, at 359; see also 2000 Commodities Act Paved the Way for 
Problems, NPR (Mar. 20, 2009, 4:00 PM), 
https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=102185942 (explaining that the 
attempt proved to be futile when Chairwoman Born s proposal to discuss risk-protection 
regulation of the widely growing derivatives market was shot down by President Clinton s 
Working Group on Financial Markets). 
146 THE PRESIDENT S WORKING GRP. ON FIN. MKTS, OVER-THE-COUNTER DERIVATIVES 
MARKETS AND THE COMMODITY EXCHANGE ACT, supra note 144. 
147 See 2000 Commodities Act Paved the Way for Problems, supra note 145. 
148 See COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, OCC BANK DERIVATIVES REPORT SECOND 
QUARTER tbl.1 (2008). 
149 Id. at tbl.3. 
150 Dr. Issahaku Salifu, The Role of Over-the-Counter (OTC) Derivatives in Global 
Financial Crisis and Corporate Failures in Recent Times and Its Regulatory Impacts, 6 
EUROPEAN J. ACCT., AUDITING, & FIN. RESEARCH 53, 58 (2018). 
151 The Financial Crisis and the Role of Financial Regulators: Hearing Before the H. 
Comm. on Oversight and Gov t Reform., 110th Cong. (2008) (statement of Alan 
Greenspan, former Chairman of the Fed. Reserve. Bd.). 
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of oil and gas derivative products were bought and held by corporations 
which would be afflicted by large price swings.152 However, under the 
CFMA, there was no regulatory oversight of the electronic trading 
facilities that Enron operated on.153 Until its 2001 collapse, Enron was 
hailed as an industry leader in electronic OTC market trading of energy 
derivatives.154 The downfall of Enron cost nearly $70 billion in market 
attributed to accounting fraud and embezzlement, the lack of disclosure of 
practices to go undetected for nearly an entire year.155 
3.6  Alternative Net Capital Rule (2004) 
156 An amended Rule 
15c3-1157 -dealers158 to use an 
alternative method to compute the net capital they were required to keep 
as emergency reserves.159 One intriguing aspect of the amendment was the 
rather an increase in regulatory supervision.160 Although the alternative net 
capital rule did include financial reporting requirements, it also cut the 
reserves those large Wall Street firms were required to hold by as much as 
80%.161 Essentially, it allowed abundantly more risk to be taken so long as 
head of market regulation in 2004 reassured the voting commissioners that 
 
152 See generally Kenneth B. Medlock III & Amy Myers Jaffe, Who is in the Oil Futures 
Market and How Has It Changed?, BAKER INST. (Aug. 26, 2009), 
https://www.bakerinstitute.org/media/files/Research/ef37edfc/EF-pub-
MedlockJaffeOilFuturesMarket-082609.pdf. 
153 See id. 
154 See JICKLING, supra note 138, at 2 n.2. 
155 See To Consider the Reauthorization of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission: 
Hearing Before the Comm. on Agric., Nutrition, and Forestry U.S. Senate, 109th Cong. 
208-10 (2005). 
156 See Sherman, supra note 114, at 11. 
157 This is commonly referred to as the net capital rule.  
158 See 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-1 (2004); see also U.S. GOV T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., 
GAO-04-896R, SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION: ALTERNATIVE NET CAPITAL 
REQUIREMENTS FOR BROKER-DEALERS THAT ARE PART OF CONSOLIDATED SUPERVISED 
ENTITIES (2004) (explaining that the eleven largest broker-dealers at the time would utilize 
the rule change). 
159 See U.S. GOV T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 158. 
160 See Erik R. Sirri, Director, SEC, Remarks at the National Economists Club: Securities 
Markets and Regulatory Reform (Apr. 9, 2009). 
161 See John Carney, The SEC Rule That Broke Wall Street, CNBC (Mar. 21, 2012, 1:42 
PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2012/03/21/the-sec-rule-that-broke-wall-street.html. 
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the new rule would allow the SEC to restrict the firms from excessively 
risky activity.162 
Similar to most deregulatory moves of its time, the alternative net 
163 Specifically, the 
European Union was on the verge of imposing regulatory burdens on the 
foreign operations of US investment banks.164 However, the most 
influential catalyst for the amendment came from the investment banks 
themselves. Goldman Sachs CEO, Henry Paulson Jr., led the group of five 
investment banks in a lobbying effort to rid themselves of what they 
believed were outdated regulatory burdens.165 In a show of support and 
confidence in the investment banks just prior to the 2008 financial crisis, 
then SEC Chairman, Christopher Cox, reassured investors by stating on 
166 Another basis for amending the net 
capital rule was one of boosting supply-side capital. By allowing the new 
method of computation, firms could redeploy massive sums of excess net 
capital into markets.167 
had been keeping as reserves against investment losses were freed up.168 
Then, the newly freed-up funds flowed up to the parent company, where 
it -growing but opaque world of mortgage-
backed securities; credit derivatives . . 169 
The immediate effect of the amendment to the net capital rule was an 
increase in the leverage ratio of the largest firms.170 One of the most 
extreme examples, in the months following the deregulatory move Bear 
Stearns would increase its leverage to the point where it had $33 in debt 
for each dollar in equity.171 Industry debates continue as to the weight in 
which the 2004 amendments to the net capital rule caused the financial 
crisis. However, there is general agreement that the change was a primary 
factor in how widespread the crisis became.172 Economists note the fact 
 
162 Stephen Labaton, The SEC Rule that Let Banks Pile on Debt, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 3, 
2008, 6:18 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/id/27005436. 
163 Id. 
164 Id. 
165 See Stephen Labaton, Agency s 04 Rule Let Banks Pile Up New Debt, N.Y. TIMES 
(Oct. 2, 2008), https://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/03/business/03sec.html. 
166 Id. 
167 See U.S. GOV T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 158. 
168 See Labaton, supra note 165. 
169 Id. 
170 See id. 
171 Id. 
172 Carney, supra note 161. 
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private-label mortgage securities and a huge buildup of mortgage-related 
173 
PART 4: PREDICTING THE FUTURE WITH LESSONS OF 
YESTERYEAR 
Since 2017, there has been a historic effort to reduce regulation174 and 
it has become imperative to look back and learn from the successes and 
failures of past eras of similar action. By looking at the approaches taken 
and subsequent outcomes of historical deregulation efforts in financial 
markets one can gain a better understanding of what works and what does 
not. This Part analyzes the three proposed deregulatory changes presented 
in Part 2 using the lessons learned from deregulation of past eras. Those 
analyses are used in support of conclusions as to the likely outcomes if 
 
4.1  An End to Quarterly Reporting Would End Market Efficiency 
& Be Struck Down 
the cost-benefit analysis of mandatory disclosure in federal securities 
regulation is a favorable one . . . ., mandatory disclosure should make 
175 
The various proposals to end the historical practice of quarterly 
reporting for public companies would likely lead to significant market 
inefficiencies and increased rates of more severe fraud. Since the inception 
of investment market regulation in the United States, diligence via 
disclosure has been the cornerstone upon which the modern regulatory 
framework was 
has consistently held that adequate disclosure is fundamental to a fair and 
176 Even in recent years, the SEC Chairman has 
 
173 Id. (citing Jeffrey Friedman & Wladmir Kraus, ENGINEERING THE FINANCIAL CRISIS: 
SYSTEMIC RISK AND THE FAILURE OF REGULATION (2011)). 
174 THE COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISERS, THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF FEDERAL 
DEREGULATION SINCE JANUARY 2017: AN INTERIM REPORT 1 (June 2019), 
https://www.banking.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/The-Economic-Effects-of-Federal-
Deregulation-Interim-Report.pdf. 
175 de Fontenay, supra note 45, at 473 (citing Merritt B. Fox, Retaining Mandatory 
Securities Disclosure: Why Issuer Choice Is Not Investor Empowerment, 85 VA. L. REV. 
1335, 1339 (1999)). 
176 Allen et al., supra note 94, at 275. 
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177 However, 
if enacted, bringing an end to substantive quarterly reporting would spare 
marginal corporate reporting costs at the expense of the valuable market 
efficiency attributable to informed investors. 
Ending quarterly reporting would also be disregarding nearly fifty 
years of economic theory that the function of investment markets is to 
allow capital to be put to its most productive use in an efficient manner. 
However, 
be cut in half because of the new six-month reporting schedule. Even if 
the most productive place to deploy capital could be identified, 
redistribution would theoretically occur half as often because of the extra 
ninety-day delay on the availability of substantive information; thus, 
reducing the second prong of efficient manner as well. Not to mention, the 
suggestion of press-release styled information is a bit less than innovative 
genius than it is current reality in practice. While admittedly over-
disclosure can have downfalls, and as stated in the regulation itself, 
 . . .  a possibility that high levels of immaterial disclosure can 
obscure important information or reduce incentives for certain market 
178 Nevertheless, 
disclosure of material items is required for a reason. Simply saying 
investors are too stupid to read or understand the material provided in 
quarterly disclosures (which are commonly fewer pages than this 
comment) is not only an illogical rationale for deregulation but also flips 
a middle finger to the same Main Street investors the Commission is 
funded to serve. Moreover, a reduction in reporting would remove 
regulation which provides economic benefit, not economic cost. The 
cost-benefit analysis of reporting has favored mandatory disclosure for 
decades.179 Disregarding years of facts and data when making regulatory 
decisions that affect trillions of dollars would be as illogically dangerous 
as trying to avoid nuclear war via Twitter. 
On top off inefficiency, losing the transparency provided by quarterly 
reporting would likely increase the average length and severity of 
corporate fraud. One of the most prominent accounting firms in the world, 
[q]uarterly reporting also 
helps reduce risks in the corporate financial reporting system by 
 
177 Jay Clayton, Remarks at Meeting of the Investor Advisory Committee, U.S. SEC. & 
EXCH. COMM N (Dec. 13, 2018), https://www.sec.gov/news/public-statement/clayton-
remarks-investor-advisory-committee-meeting-121318. 
178 Business and Financial Disclosure Required by Regulation S-K, 81 Fed. Reg. 23916, 
23919 (Apr. 22, 2016). 
179 de Fontenay, supra note 45, at 473 (citing Merritt B. Fox, Retaining Mandatory 
Securities Disclosure: Why Issuer Choice Is Not Investor Empowerment, 85 VA. L. REV. 
1335, 1339 (1999). 
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facilitating timely identification and resolution of potential accounting and 
reporting i 180 A stark example of the potential for negative results 
around decreases in disclosure requirements was seen in the role that the 
similar fashion, bringing an end to quarterly report
the direct cause of an increase in occurrences of fraud. However, just as 
would likely allow fraud to go unnoticed for longer periods than would 
happen under the current reporting regime. By cutting available 
judicial deterrence due to the same general lack of information.181 In the 
end, history suggests the various proposals to decrease mandatory 
disclosure would lead to market failures. 
4.2  Harmonization Initiative: Approach with Caution, Risk 
Ahead 
The Securities Act, as deconstructed, turns out to be a malleable 
vessel into which a newly emerging deregulatory philosophy is being 
poured 182 
result in a mix of the desired direct effects and indirect consequences if 
enacted without a narrower focus toward small issuers. With the potential 
would reduce complexity, eliminate economic costs to issuers, and 
increase availability of private capital. However, the potential uptick of 
capital being deployed in riskier ventures, lack of substantive effectiveness 
in relation to small issuers, and furthering decline of public market 
opportunities raise red flags that should be addressed prior to any 
enactment. 
Encouragingly, altering the regulatory framework for raising capital 
in order to reduce complexity while still maintaining some level of 
required compliance has proven to be a successful method of market 
deregulation. The allowance for shelf registration by Rule 415 is evidence 
 
180 Ernst & Young, supra note 44, at 5. Ernest and Young went on to further express their 
support for retaining quarterly reporting for all domestic registrants, because the 
transparency it provides benefits investors, and it has contributed to making the US public 
capital markets so successful. E&Y believes quarterly reporting minimizes information 
asymmetry between management and investors and reduces market uncertainty.  
181 Palmiter, supra note 21, at 6. 
182 Id. at 2. 
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of that concept. Similar to Rule 415, harmonization would eliminate 
offering complexities while still requiring a certain level of disclosure 
under its new simplified framework. While shelf registration did lead to 
isolated losses for underwriters in its early days, it evolved with 
syndication that could diversify risk and has become a popular offering 
method that is still used today. There is no reason to believe that the 
Harmonization Initiative, if put into p  
In the longer-term, however, history suggests that Harmonization will 
further the decline of opportunities in public investment markets in favor 
of their private counterparts. While easing regulatory burdens in private 
market
public markets has gone largely unaddressed.183 
surprising omission, because the changes to the private side of securities 
184 With 
incentives to go to public markets for capital and the majority of investors 
are only 
concept release, Chairman Clayton admitted to the harm of this trend by 
this is an issue.185 Nevertheless, by providing further 
Harmonization Initiative would likely only further the decline of new 
public market investment opportunities. 
Moreover, the Harmonization Initiative may also indirectly increase 
the amount of capital deployed in riskier investments a result that has 
proven disastrous in the past. One need not look further back than 2008 to 
see the destructive effect that heavy investment in riskier ventures can 
cause. Similar to the way that GLB and the alternative net capital rule 
allowed massive amounts of capital to flow into risky derivatives, 
harmonization would ease the flow of capital into private, and typically 
unproven small companies. Even more alarming is the fact that, while so 
few cared to assess the health of their mortgage-backed investments pre-
2008, private market investors would have little way of doing so even if 
they wanted to due to the decreased transparency in non-public markets. 
That increased risk-taking with a lack of transparency is what history urges 
we approach with caution against making the same mistakes again. 
 
183 de Fontenay, supra note 45, at 466. 
184 Id. 
185 CNBC, Clayton: Individuals, institutions play by the same rules in public markets, 
CNBC (Sept. 19, 2019, 10:00 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/video/2019/09/19/delivering-
alpha-clayton-ross-sorkin-squawk-box-private-public-
markets.html?&qsearchterm=jay%20clayton. 
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4.3 Adding Accredited Investors Will Balance Access, Not 
Quality: 
Addressing the problem of investor access, by potentially altering a 
definition that has gone nearly unchanged for almost forty years, the 
proposal will too chip away at the longstanding partition between public 
and private investment markets. Such willingness embodies the historical 
success of slowly lifting regulatory burdens in favor of free market 
efficiencies. 
Similarities in the potential for financial innovation between the 
First, the proposal would directly allow for hundreds of thousands of retail 
investors to access the seemingly endless investment opportunities in 
private markets. With the recent examples of overwhelming returns from 
in on the proverbial ground floor, the proposal would allow such 
opportunities almost immediately. 
Second, the ancillary effect of increased innovation by small private 
issuers could be overwhelmingly positive for retail investors. Indeed, the 
dly took time to 
reach retail investors, but with time it fostered competition that created 
greater options and opportunities when it came to small investors. 
Expanding the accredited investor pool has similar potential in a slightly 
more direct route. It would also increase capital available for some smaller 
issuers which may have not been able to catch the eye of private equity 
and venture capital firms. 
Nevertheless, the proposed expanded definition would likely not 
change the decision-making of offering issuers whose first preference is 
private investment firms. Regulators have acknowledged the negative 
186 The opportunities 
awaiting them in private markets are unlikely to be of the best quality 
anyways. With a seemingly endless stream of private equity and venture 
capital money, newly accredited individual investors will likely only be 
offered access to lower-grade opportunities that large firms previously 
rejected. But even if the pitches that would be made to newly accredited 
individuals offer less monetary potential, the concerns of increased fraud 
in private offerings where less-
supported by any evidence that the frequency of fraud in private markets 
is affected by the monetary thresholds for accredited investors.187 
 
186 CNBC, supra note 185. 
187 See Recommendations Regarding the Accredited Investor Definition, supra note 72, 
at 2. 
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CONCLUSION 
We conclude this financial crisis was avoidable. The crisis was the 
result of human action and inaction, not of Mother Nature or computer 
models gone haywire. The captains of finance and the public stewards 
of our financial system ignored warnings and failed to question, 
understand, and manage evolving risks . . . .To paraphrase 
Shakespeare, the fault lies not in the stars, but in us 188 
The three deregulatory proposals of recent years each have the 
potential to meaningfully change a respective aspect of investment 
markets in some way. Although when looking at each through the lens of 
historical examples the likely outcomes are considerably different. An end 
to public company quarterly reporting requirements would remove the 
unquantifiable value of efficiency informed investors and will likely lead 
to prolonging fraud, just as historically shown with CFMA. Whereas, by 
taking certain unnecessary complexity away from portions of the offering 
exemption framework could have positive results, but the broad nature of 
the changes would likely lead to indirect and unintended consequences 
down the road. Independently significant is the likelihood for successful 
integration of individuals into private markets through the accreditation 
expansion proposed within the same concept release. 
Financial markets have been constantly changing for decades and, 
while the rules must change as well, assuming the fundamental impacts of 
deregulation would be different this time could be a pricey yet 
avoidable
future missteps. Yet somehow, historical warning signs are all too often 
disregarded for the impractical belief that this time is different somehow. 
end up so well. The problem is not that the answers are not there for us
the problem simply is us, our willingness to look, and our stubbornness to 
admit we got it wrong. While each proposed example of deregulation has 
clear goals that project positive outcomes, it would be unwise to ignore the 
past results of similar concepts. Because this time  
 
188 Fin. Crisis Inquiry Comm n, supra note 130, at xvii (emphasis added). 
 
